Introduction
Belief revision theory studies three kinds of doxastic movements: expansions, revisions, and contractions. Expansions and revisions are about learning or acquiring new beliefs. Expansion is the unproblematic case where the new belief is consistent with the old ones and can hence be added without further ado. Revision is the problematic case where the new belief is inconsistent with the old ones and can hence be accepted only when some of the old beliefs are given up; the problem is to find rules for this process. Contractions are directly about giving up beliefs without adding new ones. If we require beliefs to be deductively closed, this is problematic, since we cannot simply delete the belief in question; the remaining beliefs would entail it in turn. So, again the problem is to find rules for this process.
There is an argument over the priority of these doxastic movements. As I have presented them, revision seemed to be a composite process, a contraction followed by an expansion. This view is championed by Isaac Levi, e.g., in Levi (2004) . Others wonder how there can be genuine contractions; even for giving up beliefs you need to get a reason, i.e., to learn something. There is no need to decide the argument. I think there are good reasons for taking revisions and contractions to be on a par, firmly connected by Levi's and by Harper's identity (cf., e.g., Gärdenfors 1988, sect. 3.6) . This paper will be mainly about contractions and mention revisions only supplementarily.
I believe that the three movements are dealt with by the well-known AGM theory (Alchourr6n et al. 1985; Gärdenfors 1988 ) in a completely satisfactory way; I shall state my main reason below. Of course, there is a big argument over the adequacy of the AGM postulates for revision and eontraetion; sec, e.g., the many alternative postulates in Rou (2001, eh. 4) . However, let us be content here with the standard AGMtheory.
First publ. in: EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science : Launch of the European Philosophy of
Science Association / ed. by Mauricio Suárez... (Eds.) . Dordrecht : Springer, 2010, pp. 279-288 Konstanzer (1983, eh. 5) . How should you revise or contraet your beliefs several times? Wh at are the rules for doing so? Some iterative postulates scem accepted, some are eontested (see the overview in Rou 2009), and the issue is sti 11 very much under dispute.
A minor form is a problem first discussed by Fuhrmann (1988) ; it is about multiple eontraefioll, as he ealled it. There the issue is to give up several heliefs not one after the other, but at once. This is a relevant issue. Suppose you read a newspaper article, and you aecept all details of its surprising story. In the nexl issue, the journalist apologizes; the article was a Ist April's joke, a make-believe from the beginning to the end. In this way, il is not uneommon that several or your beliefs at on ce lurn our not 10 he mainlainable.
In fact, Fuhrmann and Hansson (1994) distinguish two forms of multiple contraction. The contraelion of a set {A J, ...• An} of beliefs may take the form of ehoiee eOlltraetion where YOll are reqllested to give up at least one of the beliefs A J, ••. , An. This form is probably uninteresting; in any case it has a simple solution: the request is the same as that for a single eontraction of the eonjunction of A J, ... , An; if you give up the conjunction, you have to give up at least one of the conjllncts. Hence, this ca se is covered by standard AGM eontraction.
The other form is whal they eall paekage contrae/ion where you are indeed asked to give up all the beliefs A J, ..• , An, as it was in my example above. Now the answer is not obvious ar all; we shall see below why the obvious attempts are inadequate. In fact, as far as I know, the problem has not found a satisfactory solution. Fuhrmann and Hansson (1994) propose some axioms partially charaeterizing package contraction, but they are quite tentative about these axioms and apparently not satisfied. Fuhrmann (1997) does not gel heyond these axioms, and Hansson (1999, sect. 2.16) aequicsces in a weak axiomatization, which, however, he is able to show to be comp1ete relative to the weak semantics he proposes. As far as I know, the problem beeame negleeted afterwards. The goal 01' the paper is to present a complete and satisfaetory solution.
As observed by Hansson (1999, seet. 3.17) there is the parallel problem of multiple revision by a set {A J •..• , An} of beliefs. In package revision, you are asked to aeeept all of the new heliefs A J, ••. , An. This is obviously the same as accepting their eonjunction, and thus (he ease reduces to single AGM revision. In choice revision, you are requested to aeeept at least one of those beliefs, and again Ihere is no obvious answer. (Note that you may aeeept their disjunetion withoul aceepting any of the disjuncts ; so accepting their disjunction is no way 10 meel to request.) The problem is as difficult as that of package contraetion . I assume it ean be solved hy similar means. However, I shall not pursue this ease here, sinee it seems artifieial and without natural applications, unlike the case of package contraction. which is iterable, and which hence solves the problem of iterated belief revision and contraction. Hild and Spohn (2008) show which set of laws 01' iterated contraction is entailed by ranking theory and proves its completeness. Ranking theory also provides a plausible model of multiple contraction, as I hope to show below; the behavior of multiple contraction entailed by it will turn out to be quite simple. The issue is much less involved lhan the problem of iteration. The plan of the paper is straightforward. In Section 24.2 I shall explain the problem of package eontraction in formal detail. Section 24.3 will introduee the ranking theoretie material as far as needed. Section 24.4, finally, will present the ranking theoretic account of paekage eontraetion.
The Problem of Multiple Contraction
Let me first recall the AGM aceount of contraetion, in an equivalent form. The standard way is to represent beliefs, or rather their eontents, by semences, presumably because one wanted to do logic. However, the formalism is much simpler when beliefs are represenled by propositions; one need not worry then about logically equivalent semences. This is the way I always preferred.
Hence, let W be a non-empty set 01' possibiJities or possible worlds, and A be an algebra 01' subsets of W. The members of Aare propositians. For the sake of simplicity, I shall assume A to be finite; but nothing depends on this. The first notion we need is that of a belief set: Definition 1. IC is a belief set irf IC is a proper filter in A, i.e., iff, given the finiteness of A, there is a proposition C CIC) f 0, the eore of IC, such that
By assuming C CIC) to be non-empty, I exc1ude inconsistent belief sets right away.
Deduetive c10sure of belief sets is built into definition land into the propositional approach.
In this approach the AGM Ihcory of eontraction looks thus: Definition 2. + is a single contrac/ion for the belief set IC iff + is a function from A -{W} into the set of belief sets such that: 
To conlraet by thc eonjunction guarantees only that at least one of (he conJuncts has to go; but the other may he retained, and then the package re~uction would be unsuc-
) n ß = 0, is, no doubt, a basIC requm:ment. In o~her words: it would be wrong to equate package contraction with ehoiee contractJon. They agree only in the degenerate case of contraction by a si ngleton. .
Nor may package contraction
would guarantee success; if the disjunction has to give way, the disjuncts have to do so. too. However, the proposal is c1early too strong. One may weil give up both disjuncts while retaining the disjunction; in any case, this should not be excluded. Package contraction must also be distinguished from iterated contractlOn. The easiest way to see this is that iterated contractions need not commute; we may have
When one asks in such a case with which of the two terms K -;-[A, BI should be identified, the obvious answer is: with none. There is no such asymmetry in the idea of package contraction. Hansson (1993) gives a nice example in which commutativity of iterated contractions intuitively fails.
In thc onooino connict between [ndia and Pakistan. troops have been sent to the border e " from both si des. A friend has told me that an agreement has been reached between the two countries to withdraw the troops. I believe in this. I also believe that each of the two governments will withdraw its troops if theTe is such an agreement. il mighl be explained in the laUer terms and thus could be reduced away as an independent phenomenon. However, they are not happy with that option, either, because they believe to see its incompatibility with the approach they chose instead (cf. Fuhrmann and Hansson (1994) , p 62). I believe they were mistaken, as we shall soon sec. On (he other hand, it is intuitively not fully perspicuous that this should bc the right explanation. So, one must look for another approach, anyway. The only approach left for Fuhrmann and Hansson (1994) is the axiomatic one: if wc cannot define package contraction, we can at least try to characterize it. And so they start appropriately generalizing the AGM postulates. This works convincingly for Inclusion, Vacuity, Success, and Recovery, and they even produce representation results for their generalization (see their theorem 9 on p 59). However, they are not sure what to do with Intersection and Conjunction; Sven Ove Hansson told me that he no longer believes in the proposals made there on p 56.
Instead, in Hansson (1999. sect. 2.(6) he offers a different axiomatie characterization in the AGM style. That is, he generalizes the notion of a selection function so basic to the AGM approach to the notion of what he calls a package selection function and then proposes to define package contraction as a partial meet package contraction relative to such a package selection function. The relevant axiomatization contains adaptations of Inclusion, Vacuity, and Success and a strengthening of Recovery called P-relevance; it does not contain, however, anything corresponding to Intersection and Conjunction that are so important to single contractions. Since, no progress seems to have made on this point.
Required Basics of Ranking Theory
I believe that ranking theory can help here and provide a plausible account of multiple contraction in the package sense. In order to present it, I have to develop the relevanr portion of ranking Iheory. The basic notion is this: Definition 3. K is a ranking junclion for A iff K is a function from A into N' Of course, both may be 0, in whieh case K is neutral or unopinionated about A.
The law of negation and the law disjunction ensure that {AIK(A) > O} is indeed a consistent and deductively closed belief set. Let us denote this belief set by K(K). A main reason for giving the basic role to dis belief rather than belief is the following definition of eonditional ranks (that would be less perspicuous in terms of degrees of belief):
Equivalently, we have
[the law of conjunction] that says that your degree of disbelief in A-and-B is given by your degree of disbelief in A plus the additional degree of disbelief in B given A. This is intuitively most plausible.
The dynamics of subjeetive probabilities is stated in various conditionalization rules in terms of eonditional probabilities. Likewise, the definition of conditional ranks helps us stating a dynamics of belief and disbelief. The idea is not simply that by learning A you move to the ranks given A. This would assume that you learn A with maximal certainty that ean never be undone. The idea is rather that you learn A with some, but not neeessarily maximal firmness, as Jeffrey eonditionalization (Jeffrey 1965, eh. 11) proposes in the probabilistie case. Ir, following Jeffrey, we assume, moreover, that by learning A your eonditional ranks given A and given A do not change, we are able to state our first rule of belief change: Definition 5. Let K(A) < 00 and n E N'. Then, the A,n-conditionalization KA,n of the ranking function K is defined by KA,n(B) = min {K(BIA), n + K(BIA)}.
It is easily checked that this preserves eonditional ranks given A and given A and that KA,n(A) = 0 and KA,n(Ä) = n so that A is helieved with lirmness n in KA,n. It is also clear that only KA,n has these two properties. So, the idea is that, rationally, your posterior belief state is always some A,n-conditionalization of your prior belief state. Note that this form of conditionalization can he arbitrarily iterated. Thus ranking theory has no prohlem with iterated belief change.
We shall need a slight generalization of definition 5. Jeffrey has already envisaged the possibility that experience or learning induees you to have changed probabilities for several propositions. We can copy this in ranking theory. A E E and, again, that all conditional ranks given any atom of E are preserved; they do not change just by learning news about E.
All these definitions are intuitively motivated and weil entrenched in ranking theory, a point that can be hardly conveyed in such a brief sketch. For details, I refer the interested reader to the survey in Spohn (2009) .
A,n-conditionalization generalizes expansion, revision, and contraction. If you are initially unopinionated about A, i.e., K(A) = K(Ä) = 0, then for any n > 0 the A,n-conditionalization of K obviously amounts to an expansion of your initial belief set K(K) by A (and indeed for any n > 0 to thc same expansion). If you initially disbelieve A, i.e., K(A) > 0, then for any n > 0 the A,n-conditionalization of K amounts to arevision of K(K) by A (and again for any 11 > 0 to the same revision). 
As observed in Spohn (1988, footnote 20) , expansion, revision, and contraetion thus explained in a ranking theoretic way satisfy exactly the AGM postulates. In particular, 7 is a single contraction according to definition 2 if and only if it is a ranking contraction. Since I am fond of ranking theory, this is my main reason for accepting all the AGM postulates.
Conditionalization indeed generalizes these forms of helief change in several ways. One aspect is that the three forms do not ex haust all ways of A,n-conditionalization; for instance, A may be initially believed and thus the belief in it only be strengthened or weakened by learning. The other aspect is iteration. definition 7 ean obviously be iterated and thus provide a model of iterated contraction. Hild and Spohn (2008) give a complete set of postulates governing iterated contraetion thus construed. So, let us see how these ideas may help with our present problem of multiple contraction.
A Ranking Theoretic Account of Multiple Contraction
We start with a ranking function K for A and a set 8 c A of propositions, and we ask how to change K and its associated belief set K(K) so that none of the propositions in 8 is still believed in K. It is clear that we may restrict attention to 8 ' = 8 n K(K), the propositions in 8 believed in K, sinee contraction is vacuous for the other propositions in 8. Section 24.2 has shown, moreover, thai we may have to deal with W.Spohn logical combinations of propositions in ß'. Let us focus hence o.n. the alge~ra ß: of propositions generated by ß'. There is no reason why proposlllOns outside ß should become relevant. Now we should proceed as folIows. We should start with contracting n ßI, the strongest proposition in ß* believed; it must be given up in any case. This is the same as choice contraction by ßI, and we have noted that it removes at least some beliel's in ß'. If we are lucky, it even removes all beliefs in S'; then we are done with the package reduction. This would be exceptional, though. ~ormally, we shallh~ve moved from the prior belief set K(K) = K o to a smaller beltef set K I S; Ko whlch still believes some propositions in ßI. So, in a second step, we again proceed as cautiously as possible and contract the strangest proposition in S* still believed, i.e., n {A E ß*IA E K I }. Possibly, package contraction is now completed. If ~ot,
we have arrived at a belief set K 2 S; K 1 that still holds on to some other belters in ß'. Then we add a third step, and so on until all heliefs in S' are deleted. This procedure must stop after finitely many steps.
The conception behind this procedure is the same as in ordinary eontraction of a single proposition: change as Iittle as possible till the contraction is successful, where minimal change translates here into giving up the weakest beliefs, the negations of which receive the lowest positive ranks. In this way, package contraction turns out as a special case of generalized conditionalizalion specified in definition 6. Note that my intuitive explanation of package contraction was in terms of successive contractions; but in order to describe the result in one step we require the expressivt! power of generalized conditionalization. It easily checked that this model of package contraction satisties all the postulates endorsed by Fuhrmann and Hansson (1994, pp 51-54) . Ir wt! accept the explication, we can immediately complete their theory of package contraction. First, it is obvious from the construction above that:
A fortiori, we have
wh ich translates into the rankingframework what Fuhrmann and Hansson (1994, p 56) propose as gt!neralization of Intersection . Moreover, it is obvious from our construction lhat: If by contracting C the whole 01' ß is contracted as weil, our iterative procedure for contracting ß U C must stop at the same point as that for comracting C. (3) is what Fuhrmann and Hansson (1994. p 56) orfer as generalization of Conjunction. Thus, their tentative praposals are in fact confirmed by our model. Indeed, the most illuminating result concerning our explication is: I lake this 10 be a desirable theorem. It might have been difficult to motivate it as adefinition of package contraction; but if it is a consequence of a plausible explication, thisestablishes mutual support for the t!xplication and the theorem. In some sense, the theorem mayaIso be disappointing. 11 says that package contracIion is reducible to ordinary single contraction, after all, and is not an independent general issue.
I am nOI sure whether I am thereby contradieting Fuhrmann and Hansson (1994) . They have doubls about (1) (see there p 62) and hence about the ensuing assertions. However, the douhts are raised only on their weaker axiomatic basis intended to leavt! 1'00111 for denying (I )-(4). Hansson (1999) no longer comments on the propewes (I )-( 4). Thus, the only disagreemenl we may have is that I cannot share the doubts about (I). lind my explication in definition 8 uttcrly plausible, and do not see any need, hence, to relreat to a weakt!r axiomatic charaeterization.
